

George Wallace was a rabble-rouser; a “stumpy little man with heavy black eyebrows” who bewitched much of the electorate into voting for his radical third-party presidential campaign in 1968 (Frady 1). A classic demagogue, Wallace would rant endlessly on the campaign trail, denouncing civil rights and promoting segregation. Made famous by a stunning exclamation of hate at his first gubernatorial inaugural address in 1963: “Segregation now, segregation tomorrow, segregation forever!”, and by physically blocking entrance for African-Americans to the University of Alabama, he became known throughout the Deep South as the people’s governor, one who would not back down to the federal government (George C. Wallace).

But contrast this traditional view of Wallace with one of his familiar campaign lines: “I have never in my public life in Alabama made a speech that would reflect upon anybody because of race, color, creed, religion, or national origin” (Carter 344). Was he lying to the public? Or was Wallace’s seemingly hypocritical proclamation more accurate than one might imagine? Indeed, Wallace was more mainstream than one might have remembered. His progressive campaign tactics and fiery stump speeches made him much-beloved among the entire country, not just the Deep South (Frady 3). The eventual victor in the 1968 presidential race, Republican Richard Nixon, had to become more conservative and change his campaign tactics to account for Wallace’s popularity among conservative Southern voters. On the campaign trail, Wallace detailed the hypocrisy of political leaders through firebrand speeches that increased his personal legend while gaining him a substantial following throughout the country. Wallace’s third-party run changed the tone and tenor of presidential campaigning to anti-government and shifted the national political paradigm rightward, resulting in a

conservatization of American politics.

Even before Wallace became the most famous demagogue of the 1960s, his whole life revolved around elected politics. George C. Wallace was born in 1919 in southeastern Alabama. Typical of many white Southerners that grew up in this time period, Wallace “never displayed hostility towards blacks” and had black friends growing up (Green 64). However, Wallace, like most whites at the time, simply accepted segregation as a way of life (Green 64). At the time, “slavery...[was] ignored by many historians,” and popular culture movies like *Birth of a Nation* and *Gone with the Wind* helped reinforce these beliefs (Pickens 20, Young 163). In 1946, at the age of 27, Wallace was elected to the Alabama State Legislature after an honorable discharge from the Army in World War II. During the campaign, Wallace “appealed to southerners’ pride” by discussing how the North hurt the South after the Civil War (Leshner 71). However, contrasted with the traditional view of Wallace as a conservative radical, some of Wallace’s early beliefs were surprisingly progressive. For example, once elected, he delivered on his main campaign promise to create vocational technical schools for both whites and blacks. Furthermore, Wallace befriended many Alabamian Jews to get elected, and many of these Jews even campaigned with him throughout his political career (Leshner 70). Wallace was not outwardly bigoted—yet.

After five years as a state representative, Wallace became increasingly popular and decided to run for judge in Alabama’s Third Judicial District (Leshner 88). Wallace hammered his opponent, the wealthy Preston Clayton, throughout the campaign. Contrastd with the “mansion” in which Clayton lived, Wallace lived in a humble apartment, and used that to his political advantage (Leshner 90). Drawing on his time as a sergeant in the Army and comparing it

with that of higher-ranking lieutenant colonel Clayton, Wallace appealed to the average man by imploring that all “you officers vote for Clayton, and all you privates vote for me” (Leshner 90). Wallace won the election in a landslide. While in this judicial position, although he was initially fair to blacks, Wallace realized that he had to establish segregationist credentials or his goal of attaining the governorship of Alabama would never reach fruition (Leshner 95).

Wallace did not fully give up his more progressive beliefs of white and black equality under the law until he ran and lost the race for governor of Alabama in 1958. During the campaign, after he denounced the Ku Klux Klan, both the NAACP and the Jewish minority in Alabama endorsed Wallace (Frady 126). But Wallace was soundly trounced by segregationist candidate John Patterson, who openly accepted the support of the KKK (Frady 126). To Wallace, eventually becoming governor was more important than sticking to his values and beliefs. Wallace’s “morality [was] the morality of the majority” (Frady 13). Immediately after he learned the results of the loss, he said to his campaign team that “John Patterson out niggued me. And boys, I’m not goin to be out niggued again” (Frady 127).

And George Wallace made sure he was never “out-niggued” again. In 1962, he ran to the far right of former governor Jim Folsom and won his first out of four non consecutive governorships. Although Wallace kept discussing liberal issues on the campaign trail, he quickly realized what was most important to the electorate: “I started off talking about schools and highways and prisons and taxes—and I couldn’t make them listen. Then I began talking about niggers—and they stomped the floor” (Carter 109). In one of his most famous actions as governor, Wallace confronted two black students who had wanted to attend the University of Alabama. In a purely political maneuver, Wallace engineered a photo-op standing in the

doorway of the university waxing poetic in a rousing speech about state's rights (Green 73). Although the two black students were admitted to the university the next day due to the federal mandate, the publicity Wallace received for promoting state's rights to hinder black advancement "propelled [him] into the national spotlight" (Green 73). However, if on the national spectrum Wallace's political views appeared to have shifted, in Alabama, Wallace still promoted social programs, trade schools, pensions, and better infrastructure for both whites and blacks, even if he had enough "practical political sense to know cursing Negroes was popular" (Green 65, 69).

By the time 1968 rolled around, Wallace was a household name across America, and he decided to run for president as a third-party candidate. Wallace's plan was to carry the South and narrowly win a midwestern state to obtain the most electoral votes, which would force the U.S. House of Representatives to select the victor between Wallace, Republican Richard Nixon and Democrat Hubert Humphrey (Carter 338). In running, Wallace hoped to "turn back local institutions to the state," cut foreign aid, and put conservative justices on the Supreme Court (Carter 338-9). Looking back at the campaign, freelance journalist Marshall Frady remarked in April of 1968 that Wallace was a serious candidate:

It seems quite possible that he will actually manage to pitch the election of the next President of the United States into the House of Representatives for the first time in 144 years—which will place him in the position of arbitrating who our next president will be, and what certain strategic domestic policies will be. (Frady vii)

By the end of August of 1968, Wallace was in control of the Deep South, but trailed Nixon in the rest of the region. In some national polls, Wallace was garnering support of up to 20% (Carter 343). However, Wallace's support waned in the end, and he received 13.5% of the vote, winning outright Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and Georgia. He had run the

most successful third-party presidential campaign since Teddy Roosevelt in 1912.

Wallace rose to the national scene in the 1960s at the perfect time. The Civil Rights movement was fading as many white Americans were tiring of urban violence and rioting. As a result, many people were susceptible to Wallace's demagoguery. In the summer of 1967, race riots in Newark and Detroit saw some blacks sniping police officers and police officers responding by firing randomly into ghettos and killing 24 blacks (Carter 302). In total, the 1967 summer led to 77 deaths, 4,000 arrests, and \$500 million in damages (Carter 302). According to Southern journalist Joe Azbell, "shrewd civil rights activists had manipulated the left-wing news media" for a decade by putting "semiliterate, tobacco-chewing white lawmen on one side," and a "praying, forgiving, black" on the other. Television cameras streaming videos of "burning, sniping, looting black mobs" shattered this peaceful depiction of blacks for many whites (Carter 304).

Wallace seized on the rioting to score political points. At the National Convention of the Fraternal Order of Police in August of 1966, Wallace blamed urban violence on Communists, and blamed president Lyndon Johnson for not being tough on inner-city crime (Carter 305). Polls backed up Wallace's paranoid rhetoric, with around half of all Americans believing Communists were in some way behind the rioting (Carter 305). Many white Americans thought blacks should buckle down like other immigrant groups had in the past instead of rioting (Carter 304). According to these whites, by working hard and abiding by the law, blacks would eventually realize social and economic change. Furthermore, many of these whites were also "ambivalent" about the turbulent changes of the 1960s (Carter 305). Contrary to today's perception of the Civil Rights movement as galvanizing a sudden change in the minds of whites,

many of these whites had mixed feelings about the idea of black equality.

Wallace played off middle-class whites' fear of urban rioting through his patriotic campaign speeches and campaigning tactics that glorified 19th century whites in America. Wallace's "punchy campaign oratory" was his primary mode of campaigning for the presidency (Green 71). Before speeches, to get the crowd (of primarily working class whites) excited, he would blare patriotic songs like "Battle Hymn of the Republic," which was somewhat ironic because "Hymn" was played on the Union side in the Civil War (Carter 314). His speeches tended to reflect the trend of southernization in U.S. pop culture. Working class whites, having heard about urban violence and rioting in the media, "looked back through [a] romanticized filter" at the predominantly rural Southern U.S. People forgot about the poverty of their ancestors and the enslavement of African-Americans, and instead remembered the 1800s as a time when communities were safe and people respected one another. Another reflection of this southernization trend was that country music, a means of glorifying southern culture, became the "conservative voice of young white working class Americans" (Carter 316).

But although pop culture seemed to be becoming more Southern, in reality, the South was transforming into the North. Burger chains and highways were popping up all over the South, just like they had in the North. Southerners were moving to big cities en masse, and were leaving typical rural Southern communities behind. In his speeches, Wallace frightened Southerners by saying that Northerners could change how future generations viewed Southern heritage and culture: "And if you got a book sayin' Robert. E. Lee was a good man, and the Confederate flag was a symbol of honor, they can put in books sayin' Robert E. Lee was a bad, vulgar man, and the Confederate flag was a symbol of dishonor" (Frady 126). Wallace

also cited fear of the South transforming into the North when he rejected school desegregation. Wallace would say that Northerners will send your “chillun ten miles over in another country so they can conduct *social experiments* on them” (Frady 26). These “social experiments” were new schools made up of both white and black children that Northern legislators had implemented in the South over the previous decade. Wallace’s likening desegregation to social experimentation resonated with Southerners who had grown up distrusting the North.

To nostalgic working class whites who felt saddened by the supposed loss of morals and increase in crime in the U.S., Wallace was a defender of “common everyday folks who struggled to make a decent living, to go to church, to raise their children, and to pay their taxes” (Carter 313-4). His blunt and honest speeches railed against urban crime and desegregation, two issues with which working class whites generally agreed with him, regardless of where they lived. Wallace’s popularity can be demonstrated by his main fundraising tactic: getting working class whites to contribute small amounts of money. More than 80% of the \$9 million he raised in his presidential campaign was made up of small contributions of less than \$50 (Carter 337). Wallace “broke new ground” in his effective grassroots campaign, even though he was not the first candidate to employ the strategy (Carter 337). He also used the political movie to his advantage. In the spring of 1968, Wallace’s ad agency put together a cheap political film called *The Wallace Story* (Carter 338). The film was a collection of Wallace’s speeches on the campaign trail interspersed with messages imploring viewers to donate to the Wallace campaign (Carter 338). The film became highly successful, as \$600,000 was mailed back after a prime-time broadcast on NBC and CBS, in addition to giving Wallace’s campaign much-needed publicity. For Wallace, every nickel counted, as his campaign became illustrative

of pent-up resentment of perceived Washington elitism among small-town conservatives.

In addition to being popular in the South, Wallace was popular in white neighborhoods in the North. His support was highest in the North among white districts that abutted primarily minority districts (Carter 349). In general, these whites generally supported federal desegregation efforts and enfranchisement of blacks, but lost interest in these federal initiatives when they started to affect their own neighborhoods (Carter 349). Wallace played off these fears by “cit[ing] racial strife in northern cities caused by federal intervention in local matters” as the cause for urban violence. Interestingly, Wallace was well-received in his speaking tour of Boston and New England. To attract New Englanders, Wallace reminded them that “race was a national problem” and that they should be fearful of urban unrest (Green 74).

In later years, Wallace continued to exploit such fears to gain political advantage. A radio advertisement of Wallace’s in the race for governor of Alabama in 1972 illustrates this phenomenon. In response to a group demanding his opponent hire 50 black patrolmen, the ad goes, “Suppose your wife is driving home alone at 11 at night. She is stopped by a highway patrolmen. He turns out to be black. Think about it. Elect George C. Wallace” (Green 88). Wallace’s blunt style attracted many.

On speaking tours like the one to New England, a Wallace staple was his appeals to the “common man,” which were as vague as they were numerous. He talked about a middle class threatened by both demands of black militants and “pampered, unpatriotic, long-haired, college-educated war protesters” (Green 82). While the “common man’s” son fought and died in Vietnam, such entitled protesters managed to avoid the draft (Green 82). Wallace and his supporters resented Washington politicians that seemed to favor the Vietnam protesters and

black rioters over the “common man” (Green 82). There was a “threat posed to traditions and values” by “liberal elites” such as the college professors and protesters (Carter 299).

On the campaign trail, Wallace deified the mythical Jacksonian common man over the educated elites: “You can get good solid information from a man driving a truck, you don’t need to go to no college professor” (Frady 14). Even though Wallace never articulated who the common man was, it was a powerful tool in his political rallies. After touring the North, Wallace said that folks on Northern campuses were “damn uncultured, ignorant intellectuals” (Frady 32). Although the term “ignorant intellectual” may seem oxymoronic, to Wallace and his listeners, it made sense. These elites may know facts and have college diplomas, but they were not well versed in morality and faith. Overall, Wallace “was an abiding critic of a big, faceless government that had lost touch with ordinary folks: taxi drivers, beauticians, construction workers” (Leshner xi). Wallace’s anti-Communist, anti-liberal, anti-government, anti-taxes, anti-handouts, anti-busing, anti-waste, and anti-crime platform created a new xenophobic undercurrent in the U.S. that influenced other politicians at the time and for years to come (Leshner xi).

Unlike other politicians, Wallace’s speeches and campaign were direct and honest and pointed out other politicians’ hypocrisy, which gained him support from government cynics. The majority of Nixon’s campaign in 1968 was run through “controlled photo ops,” partially due to his disastrous debates against John F. Kennedy in the 1960 presidential election. However, these photo ops led many people and reporters into believing Nixon was fake (Carter 334). Wallace’s “blunt, often crude” honest language was appealing contrasted to Nixon’s scripted rhetoric. Even Wallace’s critics liked his honesty. One steelworker said, “You don’t have to

worry about figuring out where he stands. He tells it like it really is” (Carter 334). In addition, Wallace was “refreshingly honest” because he did not pander to the media like Nixon (Leshner xiv). For example, throughout his campaign, Wallace denounced urban crime and called for law and order in inner cities. Some reporters thought law and order were just code words to “ignite racial antipathy” (xiv). Wallace responded:

Code words? Well, let me ask you: Would *you* walk on the streets of New York at night? Or on the streets of Detroit? No. You’re afraid. Everybody’s afraid. People in big cities put locks and chains and bolts on their doors and windows. But reporters tell me *they* say they’re ‘code words.’ *They* say... *they* say. Who’re they? (Leshner xvi)

Wallace’s response demonstrated his unfiltered nature; if he believed in something, the public would know about it. Many Southern Christian leaders rallied their parishes around Wallace as well. One preacher, the Reverend John Lanham, even said, “Outside of the visible return of Jesus Christ, the only salvation in this country is the election of George Wallace” (Carter 334).

While other candidates would avoid hot-button issues like desegregation and imply that they did not like it for fear of angering the media, Wallace would state his positions in clear ways, most notably through his political advertisements. In his famous campaign ad, “Busing/Law & Order,” Wallace used fear tactics to bash the state of the U.S. The ad starts with a prison-like school bus of white students receding into the distance. Wallace then comes on to the screen and denounces desegregation. Next, the narrator says to “take a walk in your street or park at night” as a shotgun goes off in a park. Wallace then promises to make the streets safe. The ad closes with a screen that says, “Wallace has the courage to stand up for America” (George Wallace, Appendix A). Advertisements like these won over many viewers because of their brutal honesty. Working class whites realized that Wallace understood their perceived plight and was trying to do something about it regardless of whether it was “politically

correct” to do so at the time.

In addition to campaigning honestly, Wallace attacked both Republican and Democratic politicians as “out of touch” and having identical platforms (Carter 334). There wasn’t a “dime’s worth of difference between the major candidates on key economic and foreign policy,” according to Wallace (Leshar xv). Both parties had similar views on the Vietnam War, desegregation, and urban violence. While Humphrey and Nixon, especially, dodged these questions and continued their campaign of controlled photo-ops, it made them look even more similar. “You could put them all in an Alabama cotton picker’s sack, shake them up and dump them out; take the first one to slide out and put him right back in power and there would be no change,” extolled Wallace to a friendly crowd of 6,000 Tennessee farmers (Carter 334). The quote both references rural Alabama and Wallace’s roots with the “cotton sack” analogy, while also pointing out the similarities between the two parties.

On the campaign trail, Wallace also noted the hypocrisy of Chief Justice Earl Warren and future presidential candidate George McGovern. Both of these liberal politicians demanded integration in the South, but, because they were wealthy, they sent their children to practically all white private or suburban schools rather than than the mostly black District of Columbia school systems (Leshar xv). While Warren and McGovern were forced to stutter about their own “special circumstance[s]” and “the difficulties of celebrity,” white Southerners shook their heads in disbelief at the blatant hypocrisy and gravitated even more towards Wallace (xv).

Although Wallace ultimately lost the 1968 presidential election, hints of Wallace’s campaign tactics like anti-government and anti-elitism appeared in Nixon and Carter’s presidential campaigns, demonstrating the resonance of Wallace’s tactics. Instead of being a

rabble-rouser who drifted in and out of the national consciousness, “Wallace *became* the mainstream, moving national campaign rhetoric...sharply to the right.” (Leshner xvii). According to Kevin Phillips, a special assistant to Nixon’s campaign manager, in his 1969 book, *The Emerging Republican Majority*, to beat Wallace, Nixon adopted a Southern strategy aimed to court “anti-Negro whites” (Weaver 3). In an interview with the *New York Times* in 1972, Phillips said:

From now on, the Republicans are never going to get more than 10 to 20 percent of the Negro vote and they don't need any more than that... but Republicans would be shortsighted if they weakened enforcement of the Voting Rights Act. The more Negroes who register as Democrats in the South, the sooner the Negrophobe whites will quit the Democrats and become Republicans. That's where the votes are. Without that prodding from the blacks, the whites will backslide into their old comfortable arrangement with the local Democrats. (Boyd 106)

These “Negrophobe whites” were the same voters Wallace courted in 1968. Nixon realized that he would need to win a large share of the Southern “Wallace voters” in order to hold off a three-way tie in the electoral college. Nixon’s conservative shift thereby achieved many of Wallace’s domestic and foreign goals without Wallace having to win control of the White House.

In his speeches and commercials, Nixon discussed declining law and order, and implied his opposition to desegregation (Carter 348). In a 1968 political advertisement entitled “The First Civil Right,” Nixon juxtaposed violent images of race riots and protestors from the 1960s with jarring sounds. In the background, the narrator forebodingly says that “there is no cause to resort to violence” and that the “First Civil Right of all Americans is to be free from domestic protestors.” In the end, words flash that say “this time vote like your whole world depended on it” (Richard Nixon, Appendix B). Nixon’s appeal to middle-class whites who were fed up with

rioting and violence looks eerily similar to Wallace's "Busing/Law & Order" advertisement that same year. In fact, Nixon's similar advertisement illustrates the extent of Wallace's influence on the 1968 presidential race. In order to court voters that would otherwise vote for Wallace, Nixon had to adopt Wallace's tone in his advertisements. By incorporating some of Wallace's beliefs into his ads, Nixon was able to garner the support of citizens who aligned themselves with some of Wallace's ideas but who wanted to vote for a "respectable" candidate without the stigma associated with voting for Wallace (Leshner xix).

Surprisingly, even Democrats like 1976 presidential victor Jimmy Carter embodied many of Wallace's characteristics. Carter ran a primarily anti-establishment campaign counter to the Washington elites. He played up his small-town Southern upbringing and the fact that he had no federal political experience in many of his speeches and advertisements. In one of his presidential television advertisements, "South," Carter ran in 1976, Carter played up his Southern roots and heritage. In an ad set on a Southern farm, Carter discusses the "heritage of working men and women" that make up the "backbone" of America. Carter takes aim at government bureaucrats by explaining that, under then-incumbent president Ford, the powerful receive "special favors," in a reference to Ford's controversial pardon of embattled former president Nixon (Jimmy Carter, Appendix C). Carter's distrust of the national government and of its politics was similar to Wallace's distrust of perceived Washington elites only looking out for the very wealthy and very poor, as opposed to the middle class (Leshner xii). Because of Wallace's success, politicians like Carter adopted some of his tactics like playing up their outsider status, so Wallace's legacy lived on in future politicians (Leshner xii).

Wallace was a more nuanced character than history remembers, a barometer of public

opinion rather than a knee-jerk fear-monger. Wallace's popularity in the 1960s was an expression of the frustration of many working-class whites at the time. He belonged to group of older middle-class whites who still went to church every Sunday, lived in close-knit communities with family and friends nearby, and extolled the virtues of their grandparents who had fought for the Confederacy in the Civil War. However, after enjoying almost 100 years of social dominance, this group was declining in power to younger and more volatile generations less concerned about their grandparents and more concerned about the current problems plaguing the country. According to Wallace biographer Stephan Leshner:

Wallace offered most Americans an outlet for their pent-up resentments: they were troubled by a faraway war claiming more and more lives and treasure, but galled by the excesses of antiwar demonstrators who seemed to them privileged, pampered, and unpatriotic; they were stunned by incendiary urban riots and stupefied that the government seemed to placate the looters and arsonists; they sensed that the country was losing its moral compass, that drugs and crime and teenage pregnancies and abortion and pornography and strictures on public prayer were symptoms of a society coming apart at the seams. (Leshner xvii)

Like many social groups who were majorities turned minorities, this old-school generation wanted to go back to the "way things were." However, inherent in a return to "better days" meant returning to a society in which blacks were oppressed, women "knew their place," and only certain types of white Christians would be accepted. Despite the Civil Rights movement in the 1960s and the anti-Vietnam protests, there was still a countervailing strong undercurrent of conservatism that Wallace embodied.

But did Wallace's demagoguery serve as a catalyst for conservative change in the American political landscape? Nixon became more conservative and adopted the "Southern strategy" to woo Wallace voters. Carter was anti-establishment and played up his rural anti-Washington ties. Ronald Reagan was fiercely committed to anti-communism and shrinking

the size of the federal government (Leshner xii). Clinton responded to the Los Angeles race riots with calls for law and order that had undertones of Wallace (Leshner xii). Even Barack Obama, who today we could label a moderate Democrat, used the rhetoric of the “common man” and the middle class in his campaign speeches. While none of these presidents used Wallace’s distinctive firebrand style, they did adopt some of his populist themes. Thus, Wallace, the master crowd-pleaser, shifted the political compass to the right for the coming decades.

Word Count: 4461

Appendix:

(A) <http://www.livingroomcandidate.org/commercials/1968/businglaw-and-order>

Wallace's "Busing/Law & Order" advertisement on the Living Room Candidate website.

(B) <http://www.livingroomcandidate.org/commercials/1968/the-first-civil-right>

Nixon's "The First Civil Right advertisement on the Living Room Candidate website.

(C) <http://www.livingroomcandidate.org/commercials/1976/south>

Carter's "South" advertisement on the Living Room Candidate Website.

Bibliography

Boyd, James. "Nixon's Southern Strategy 'It's All In the Charts'" *New York Times* 17 May 1970: 25+. Print.

This newspaper article is an extended interview with Kevin Phillips, a special assistant to Nixon's campaign manager who formulated Nixon's "Southern strategy." It extends the assertions made by historian Dan Carter that Wallace threatened Nixon's strategy in 1968 and forced Nixon to become more conservative. The article is used to show the inherent racism in Nixon's strategy, and the similarities between Nixon and Wallace's campaign tactics.

Carter, Dan T. *The Politics of Rage: George Wallace, the Origins of the New Conservatism, and the Transformation of American Politics*. New York, NY [u.a.: Simon & Schuster, 1995. Print.

Dan Carter found that George Wallace transformed American politics into a much more conservative society, in his biography. Most useful to me was Carter's data and facts and urban violence and riots in the 1960s, which provided the basis for my thesis that Wallace was a product of his time period who was largely successful because of the social unrest. The biography detailed Wallace's whole life, from birth to all four of his governorships spanning three decades, but I mainly used it for the chapter on his presidential run.

Frady, Marshall. *Wallace*. New York: World Pub., 1968. Print.

Marshall Frady traveled with Wallace for months before the 1968 presidential race and wrote this book the April before the election. Frady offers an unfiltered portrait of Wallace throughout his wife's run for governor in 1966 up to Wallace running for president. The book is a great primary source that helped me gauge the opinions of people at the time. It reads somewhat like a diary, and details every campaign event through the years sequentially. Plus, because Frady was given more or less unlimited access to Wallace through all times of the day, there are many juicy quotes.

George Wallace. Television Advertisement. *Busing/Law & Order*. 1968.

This is an advertisement that Wallace ran during his 1968 campaign for president. It sets jarring images of violence and school desegregation against Wallace's promises to stop the two. It is a good primary source that I use to prove the point that Wallace was clear and direct through his campaign.

Green, Donald J. *Third-party Matters: Politics, Presidents, and Third Parties in American History*. Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2010. Print.

Donald Green's compacted book about third-party candidates in general has six different chapters describing six different third party presidential campaigns for president from Ralph Nader to John Bell. The one Wallace chapter was a brief biography of Wallace and his significance to the election in general. Because the primary focus of the book is not Wallace, however, some of the information is general. I mainly used Green's book in the background section of the paper.

Jimmy Carter. Television Advertisement. *South*. 1976

This is an advertisement that Carter ran during his 1976 presidential campaign. In the ad, Carter discusses problems with Washington while walking among a rural Southern farm in casual clothing. The ad contrasts Carter with a typical Washington politician. I use the ad to prove the point that Carter, like Wallace, played up his outsider status and bashed Washington.

Leshner, Stephan. *George Wallace: American Populist*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1994. Print.

Stephan Leshner's book is a biography of Wallace that proves that Wallace was a manifestation of American's beliefs during the 1960s. Back then, Leshner argues that Americans did not support Civil Rights as much as they would like to believe. Although most Americans would not support Wallace outright, they would support candidates like Nixon that had some of his ideas. Leshner and Carter's ideas form the basis of my thesis that Wallace was a multi-dimensional man who was more mainstream than people might have imagined.

Pickens, Donald K. "Gone with the Wind." *Dictionary of American History*. Ed. Stanley I. Kutler. 3rd ed. Vol. 4. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 2003. 20-21. *Gale Virtual Reference Library*. Web. 31 Dec. 2013.

This encyclopaedia article is a general discussion of "Gone with the Wind" and its importance in American history. It briefly mentions "Gone with the Wind's" effects on Southern culture. I reference it once in the background section. as I only reference it once in the paper to prove a point about pop culture ignoring slavery and oppression of minorities.

Richard Nixon. Television Advertisement. *Busing*. 1972

This is an advertisement that Nixon ran during his 1972 reelection campaign. In the ad, Nixon

talks about his distaste for desegregation of schools. In previous drafts of the thesis, I used the ad to illustrate the similarities between Nixon's ideas and Wallaces. Nixon tries to reach a more conservative audience in the ad, and one could see Wallace saying the same things Nixon said in the ad. The ad illustrates the similarities between Nixon and Wallace's views on desegregation, showing that Wallace not as radical as people believe he was on this issue.

Richard Nixon. Television Advertisement. *The First Civil Right*. 1968.

This is an advertisement that Nixon ran during his 1968 run for president. The ad has jarring music interspersed with still photos of urban violence during the 1960s. It states that the "first Civil Right of all Americans" is to be free from violence. I use the ad to prove the point that Nixon's campaign style borrowed from Wallace, and to show demonstrate that Nixon had similar views on crime to Wallace.

"The Living Room Candidate." *The Living Room Candidate*. Prod. Carl Goodman. Museum of the Moving Image, 2012. Web. 04 Jan. 2014.

This is the website from where I collected the television advertisements from Jimmy Carter, Richard Nixon, and Wallace.

"Wallace, George Corley." *West's Encyclopedia of American Law*. Ed. Shirelle Phelps and Jeffrey Lehman. 2nd ed. Vol. 10. Detroit: Gale, 2005. 268-270. *Gale Virtual Reference Library*. Web. 24 Nov. 2013.

This is a basic encyclopaedia article that provides general information on Wallace's life. This source started my research, but it did not end up being quoted in the paper.

Wallace, George C. "1963 Inaugural Address." 1963 Alabama Inauguration. Alabama State Capitol, Birmingham. 14 Jan. 1963. Speech.

Wallace's infamous 1963 inaugural address demonstrated the extent to which he had changed from his previous more liberal positions. In the speech, he references his Confederate forebears and spoke under a Confederate flag. He extolled the virtues of segregation and racism and the speech became as controversial as Wallace himself. I use the speech to depict a typical American's view of Wallace in the introduction before I expand on that orthodox definition of Wallace.

Weaver Jr., Warren. "The Emerging Republican Majority." Rev. of *The Emerging Republican Majority*, by Kevin P. Phillips. *New York Times* 21 Sept. 1969: 3. Print.

Warren's review of Kevin Phillips' *The Emerging Republican Majority* generally describes the main points of the book and quotes some of the most important points. It implies that Phillips "Southern strategy" for Nixon was valid and was partially responsible for Nixon's victory in 1968. I use the primary source to make illustrate the similarities between Nixon's "Anti-negro whites" and Wallace voters, who were both largely Southern and racist.

Young, Paul. "The Birth of a Nation." *American History Through Literature 1870-1920*. Ed. Tom Quirk and Gary Scharnhorst. Vol. 1. Detroit: Charles Scribner's Sons, 2006. 158-164. *Gale Virtual Reference Library*. Web. 31 Dec. 2013.

This is a brief overview of the racist film that depicts Reconstruction in a twisted way, but in a way that many Southerners believed. I reference the film once during the background portion of my paper.

Bibliographic Reflection

All throughout freshman and sophomore year, I knew what to expect as a junior. I had heard the grumblings from from over-caffeinated juniors with bags under their eyes talking about the all-nighters they had pulled the night before the thesis was due. When you started off the process with ominous music, I knew what to expect: four months of torture that I would inherently hate and no sleep for days the night before the paper was due.

But the paper turned out to be fun, as I picked a topic in which I have always been interested. Plus, I'm going to get at least four hours of sleep tonight (probably). I started off the process knowing nothing about George Wallace except that he was the last third-party candidate to receive electoral votes in a presidential election. I thought the paper would be about third-party candidates in general, or the change in the Democratic party, but my eventual paper proved much different.

In the beginning of the research, I went to the good old Newton Free Library and took out a few Wallace biographies by a few respected authors, Dan Carter and Stephan Leshner. While at the library, I even found a primary source 1968 biography of Wallace by Marshall Frady published in the April before the election. I relied heavily on these three books for quotes and material, and used these books to find other primary sources.

The other sources I relied on most heavily were the political advertisements on the Living Room Candidate website that you had shown me. These primary advertisements gave good visuals for the speeches and rhetoric I had read about in the secondary sources. The website was so cool that I procrastinated on writing my detailed outline and instead kept watching political ads from the past 50 years (The "I Like Ike" commercial was especially

catchy).

Then, after I completed 91 of the notecards, I completed the detailed outline the Sunday before it was due. However, I included too much information, which made it difficult to cut down on information in the rough and final draft. Then, I wrote 90% of the rough draft on Martin Luther King, Jr. Day, and the rest the day after. During the final editing push, my mom and grandfather read the paper to ensure it was clear. My grandmother, who has lived in the North Shore for his whole life and was 30 when Wallace ran for president in 1968, reaffirmed many of my points about Wallace. He said that when Wallace visited South Boston, it was a turbulent time as the federal government mandated school desegregation. As a result, he said many of these working-class people supported Wallace's anti-desegregation views.

The best part of the process was connecting politicians from different eras to another and finding patterns in U.S history, and finding out that my thesis addresses questions that are still pertinent today. The so-called moderate Democrats Obama and Clinton are more conservative than the Democratic and Republican politicians of the 1960s. The fact that not many people attribute this conservative change in U.S. society to Wallace shows the originality of my research.

The worst part of the process, however, was how much work there was combined with the work of all of my other academic classes. Sometimes, huge deadlines for different classes would fall on the same date, and I would have to stay up late doing different assignments. Looking back, I probably should not have kept Facebook open on a tab the entire time. Well, I'm done with the thesis and time to crash.