

The American Entry into the Cold War: A Case Study of the Chinese Civil War

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The latter half of politics and conflicts of the twentieth century, as well as much of the existing power dynamics of the twenty first, or our modern era , are explained through two simple words that would become the pre-eminent term for discourse of the time period: Cold War. Indeed, a case study of the past fifty years of recent human activity would most likely reveal that the prevalence of Cold War influences cannot be understated. As the dominant conflict of a still pertinent era, many interpretations of the Cold War have emerged, including orthodox views that center a blame of the conflict on the Soviet Union, revisionists that seek to counter these traditional understandings, post-revisionism that seeks to further alter the lens and so on and so forth (Crapol 257). But while there are many different theories and lenses through which the Cold War is interpreted by historians, the general consensus places its origins between 1946 and 1950, following the escalation of tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union. According to the traditional (though admittedly Orthodox in nature) view, failure to abide by the conditions of the Potsdam agreement on the part of the Soviets, crises in Turkey and Greece caused by Soviet encroachment, and the American response to Soviet "aggression" all culminated to the outbreak of what would become the stage of world history following the second World War (Cleveland 1). And in this direct post-war period, much in fact did happen, and there are many different events which could have been seen as the initial shock that started the whole conflict between the Berlin Airlift, the American entry into Korea, or even simply Truman's calling for aid to Greece and Turkey.

But what has been dominantly neglected in most standard interpretations of the great power conflict is the importance of a war that had been raging in a then third world country since the 1920s, and had only recently just begun to see the seeds of continuation: the Chinese Civil War. Unfortunately, prevalent historic Eurocentrism generally places a focus on Western

conflict when it comes to the nascent period of the Cold War (Hippler 3). There is an evident dichotomy between relevance of the East, that primarily shifts with the Korean War, which assumes the role of one of the first proxy conflicts to emerge in the lay man's understanding. Even in the face of extensive developments that easily mirror the conditions of other undisputable Cold War conflicts such as the Korean War, the influence that the Chinese Civil War had on the development of the Cold War is often overlooked. In spite of this, the evidence for the enormous influence that the Chinese Civil War had on both the development and the course of the Cold War is undeniable, and from the perspective of the United States, its importance is only magnified through extensive American involvement. First and foremost, the conflict itself was a framework for the containment policies that would later dominate United States foreign policy in the Cold War era. Beyond that, the Marshall Mission and later attempts at diplomacy, as well as the general feel of the American populace to the American inclusion in the foreign war were also reflective of later Cold War conflict. But even precluding any other evidence, the simple extent of military involvement by the United States in the Chinese mainland only cements the importance of the civil war to the course of the Cold War. It thus arises that any consideration of the course of the Cold War, contrary to traditional interpretations that involve a plethora of alternative theory, ought to center on the Chinese Civil War as the primary opening conflict to what would eventually become the Cold War for the United States.

However, first, what must be understood is that by no means was the Chinese Civil War an arbitrary starting point for the conflict itself. Attempting to isolate a single conflict as the singular starting point would be far too simplistic. Rather, it is the first example of escalation that, from the perspective of the United States, had begun arising since the Yalta Conference of 1945 (Westad 30). In the wake of a collapsing but recalcitrant Japan and an, at that point,

militarily irrelevant Germany, the central focus of war-time ideology had become a question of structuring the coming years (Westad 31). In particular, the new world was seemingly to be dictated by bipolar spheres of influence arbitrated by the Soviet and American powers. It was thus that the phase of "great power conflict" began to appear (Westad 40). What is most notable, however, is that at this phase of the war, there was still the possibility of cooperation between the Americans and the Russians. Conflict, brinkmanship, and the characteristics that would define the onset of the Cold War had not yet become the indoctrinated religion of foreign policy. The idea of separate powerful entities engaged in communicative and cooperative "rule" of the new-forming political sphere was a constant consideration. And coupled with the relatively non-conflicting policy goals of the United States and Soviets, there seemed to be the underlying presumption that mutual assistance was a possibility (Westad 45). It was, however, a tenuous hope at most as fear, from both parties, but resentment from the United States at the inability to follow negotiations made at Yalta was soon to cancel any hope of peaceful negotiation between the two great superpowers (Westad 46). It thus ought to be understood that by the time the United States had begun its intervention, both political and military in the Chinese Civil War, the air of tension between the Soviets and the United States had already existed.

The topic, however, begs the question: what does it mean to have a conflict be defined primarily as a Cold War conflict. Military history might point towards the first Cold War conflict to actually manifest to be the Korean War, in which direct United States intervention on the behalf of the United Nations was ushered in. Other historians might be of the consensus that the dominant theme of Cold War conflict was not necessarily the introduction of proxies but rather specific conflicting interest between the two world superpowers at similar times. That is to say, a Cold War conflict in some interpretations does not necessarily have to be an engagement of any

sorts. And this is in fact true to some extent. The historiography of the Cold War interprets the definition of conflict on different levels (Crapol 258). The Berlin Air Lift was certainly not an actual battle or a war fought on any level. But it is still markedly a "conflict" of the Cold War. Thus in trying to determine metrics for the ways in which the Chinese Civil War might have represented one such conflict, there is required a sense in which the considerations are not arbitrary. And while there may not be clear metrics that have been determined by historiographers, a survey of the relevant history reveals that: first, Cold War conflict is generally dominated by a desire, primarily from the United States to contain the spread of communism. Second, Cold War conflict is not necessarily between the United States and the Soviet Union directly (though it more often than not is), but is characterized by conflict of world powers of East and West, primarily communism and capitalism. Third and finally, Cold War conflict is normally fought in the form of proxies.

There are, then, varying degrees to which the Chinese Civil War fulfills these common themes. Yet regardless of the particulars, to look at the Chinese Civil War in context reveals simply enough that the clear intention of the United States was to contain communism, that it did in fact bring both the United States and the Soviet Union, but also communist and capitalist powers into conflict, and that it could in some forms be argued as a proxy.

In spite of this, the Chinese Civil War was not a conflict that was initially dominated by Cold War considerations either. In fact, the conflict itself, as previously mentioned, had been waging since 1927 with a short intermission in between as both the Chinese Nationalist Party, the Guomindang (GMD), and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) had to settle their differences for a brief intermission during the Japanese invasion of mainland China as the Second Sino-Japanese War erupted into its brutal course (Buck 125). Following the end of World War II,

with the menace of the Japanese invaders removed, the two parties were largely allowed to lapse back into the conditions of their tenuous peace, which would be rather short-lived in the long term. It was at this time that mediation of the conflict by foreign powers, primarily the United States began to manifest in the course of the Chinese Civil War (Buck 126).

In the form of the Marshall Mission and the considerations of Truman, the first inklings of containment policies by the United States began to appear within the context of the Chinese Civil War. Interestingly enough, in its infancy, the central ideology behind the strategies employed by the United States in China were tiered and checking the Soviet was admittedly not the first express priority that was outlined by either the Truman Administration or by General George C. Marshall. In most cases, it could be argued that the United States vied for the maintenance of a crucial ally that they had been careful to support over the course of the Second World War and time periods before that (May 1002). But there were few key realizations by both parties that were relevant to the issue. The interested parties of the United States on the question of the Chinese Civil War all shared two presumptions. First that the Chinese Communists were largely controlled by Moscow, and second that a Communist success in China would be crippling to the United States (May 1005). Thus, while Marshall's mission was to seek compromise between the Communist Party and the Nationalist Party in order to maintain the integrity of an ally, the latent concern of the United States was still the prevention of a Communist victory at heart. This is because the victory of the Chinese communist would represent both a victory for communism, but also a victory for Moscow. But this sentiment was restricted simply to the cabinet of the United States government, rather it was reflected in the general populace. Even as the relatively moderate administration of the United States realistically pushed for compromise, the citizenry of the United States saw such as an

abomination. As so bombastically put by General Douglas MacArthur of the United States Army in a telegram released to papers across the United States, the Marshall Mission

Was one of the greatest blunders in American diplomatic history for which the free world is now paying in blood and disaster and will in all probability continue to do so indefinitely... Its effect could have been foreseen. It at once weakened the government (of China) and materially strengthened the Communist minority. (Pittsburgh Press 3)

There was an effect to which it seemed the American public was also of the opinion that the Communists in China ought to have been stopped.

Beyond simple sentiment at home however, even while compromise may have been seen as a rejection of prior American value in the prevention of the spread in communism, there were still different degrees to which the Marshall Mission, and United States policy in the region in general, were reflective of an order that sought to check the Soviets and communism in every way possible. That is to say, the complexity of the mission itself extends beyond the objective policy goal, but must also be looked at under the lens of other influences. Truman, in fact, realized the geographic significance of China as a buffer nation against Soviet influence. (Westad 52) And the Washington administration further realized the ability of the Soviets to take maximum advantage of their military presence in Manchuria was distinctly troubling to Washington (Levine 361). Preserving the integrity of an ally, thus also meant countering the ability of the Soviets to influence mainland China, because in doing so, the United States would be able to check the power of a dominating threat. Thus, even with the consideration that compromise might not be realistically created, Marshall himself was wary to check the ability of the Russians to be able to influence policymaking in the region. (Levine 363).

And yet still, was the revelation that the compromise proposed was not quite the sensationalized concession that MacArthur so vehemently opposed, but rather one which would

subtly yet effectively stamp out any wisp of communism. It is noteworthy to say that the coalition government that was suggested be formed out of compromise featured Chang Kai-Shek as the leader and the Communist party as a minority party with limited access to government, or as minority participants (May 1944). Thus at the same time the abhorrent compromise was not necessarily abhorrent, nor even a compromise. Analyzing the evidence at hand produces two distinct factors that affect United States policymaking, that are both distinctly of a Cold War mindset.

First is the containment of communism, which was a central theme to all Cold War policy. The want to stop the spread of communism emerges as a combination of: first, the widely-held belief that a Communist ally would be an ineffective ally. As a consequence of being the pre-eminent capitalist power of the world, reconciliation between the CCP and the US government seemed to be difficult at best. In order to maintain friendly relations with the prong of the East, it was necessary in the US eye to keep the diametrically opposed ideology out of the land (Westad 142) Only then could any real diplomatic relation exist. But second, was the fear of a unified eastern front that would challenge United States imperial power in the Pacific (Westad 56). If the Chinese were to become another premier Communist power in the region, the United States would very rapidly lose its ability to influence the Pacific region. Stopping the progression of communism in China was thus imperative to American interest in the region because otherwise much of the ability to influence would be lost.

Second, however is the realized importance of China as a buffer against the Soviet Union. If the Nationalist Party were to succeed, the United States would have a direct ally that lay directly south of their newly realized enemy of the Eastern Hemisphere. "Containing" the Soviet

Union would be as simple as hemming their borders in through the allocation of a strategically non-Communist ally.

This examination of policy behavior by the United States then logically leads to the conclusion that the Chinese Civil War was crucial in framing the context of later Cold War conflict. Most important to note is the fact that in the progression of all of these events, while escalation in the Western half of the world did exist to a partial extent, never did it arise as directly as it did in the Chinese Civil War. And in a frame of great power conflict that defines the whole meaning of the Cold War, the Chinese Civil War is also a representative norm. Whereas the pronounced power of CCP China was not as prominent as it was during the Korean War, there were still three distinct factions that all had a stake in the outcome of the conflict: the United States, the Soviet Union and the Chinese. While the primary focus of this paper is to analyze the extent of United States involvement, it is also necessary to underscore that the Soviets had also realized the importance of China. Stalin himself was very well aware of the self-same geographic significance that Truman had dawned on when it came to China. Thus even while the extensive political and military interventions of the United States were going on, the Soviet Union was not necessarily completely out of the loop (Westad 40). While their overall commitment to the conflict was markedly less than that of the United States, it would be folly to say that they were not involved in the slightest. And in terms of the interaction between the two world powers, it must be understood that the two were actively in opposition, simply with the United States taking a more pronounced stance due to its greater direct influence directly following World War II.

Yet perhaps most directly showing the extent to which the Chinese Civil War was a Cold War conflict was the degree to which the United States committed itself in the region on a

military basis. When it became apparent that a coalition government could not be established and "peace" between the two sides was not a possibility, the United States was quick to mobilize. The GMD suddenly found itself equipped with American machinery, advised by American generals, and given the wholesale commitment of the American people to help win the war (Cheng 874). On an objective level military commitment by the United States was representative of a few things existent in the status quo at the time. First and foremost, it showed an obvious desire by Congress to bolster the Nationalist Party cause and to usher in a quick victory for the American allies. Thus there was not only the political will to wish to achieve victory, but at the same time, what military commitment shows is both the belief that there is the capacity to win, and the belief that victory for the supported party was an absolute necessity. This serves only as immediate confirmation of the American agenda in the area. What needs to be understood is that as soon as the diplomatic option had been taken out, the United States ceased upon the military alternative (Westad 182). In other words, once it became apparent that passive containment of communism could not be achieved, then the aggressive stance was to be taken.

And this was exactly the case. The Americans committed upwards of \$4.5 billion in military expenditures on behalf of the GMD just two years after the end of the Sino-Japanese War while sending 50,000 American Marines to guard strategic sites, and training 500,000 GMD troops (Nguyen 321). Every effort by the United States was made to contain the communist threat militarily and every effort was made to make sure that the Americans would be able to secure a buffer against the Soviet Union.

It is, however, important to note, that while the Americans pledged this amount of support to the GMD ground, there was far less interest posed by the Soviet side to help their ally in the Communists. While the Soviets certainly saw China as important, they were also likewise

reluctant to commit to a conflict which they were unsure of they had the resources to win (Westad 21). The Soviets, however, did play a crucial role in influencing the course of the war in that they delayed the withdrawal of troops from Manchuria, despite the requests of Chiang Kai-Shek for them to do so immediately (Westad 25). This allowed further time for the CCP to prepare itself for the war and gave it much needed space. While the Soviet Union had not committed itself so fully to a Communist victory, it did still exert an influence on the war both by bolstering the CCP and hindering the GMD. In that regard, fulfilling the third metric of defining Cold War conflict becomes muddled in that the Chinese Civil War never exactly became a fully fledged conflict that involved Soviet machinery to any large case. But what cannot be denied, however, is that there was the concern of the Soviets to hinder the United States, and to help their ally in the CCP. It would thus follow that while the Chinese Civil War may have only been a conditional proxy, from the United States standpoint there was definite direct military involvement with the intention of harming Soviet interest and containing Communist spread, while from the Soviet standpoint there was the latent interest in combating such an aggressive stance.

To a greater extent, what is even more notable for the Chinese Civil War as a Cold War conflict is the ability to parallel the great power involvement in each with the progression of other Cold War conflicts. The dominant underlying themes of nearly all war that happened as a result of the tension between the Soviets and the Americans are present in the Chinese Civil War. First and foremost, an underlying resentment within the host population occurred following extensive mediation on the account of the intruder. That is to say that like in other Cold War conflicts, the people of China began to resent the American presence (Pepper 746). This emerged perhaps most distinctly during the arising of the student movements in the Chinese university students,

which all exhibited an animosity towards American intervention in the areas. As with most other foreign intervention, whether political or military, there was an extent to which questionable activity by the American presence occurred and became intrusive in the most simple yet vulgar ways (Pepper 747). At the same time, whereas the vocals of those such as Douglas MacArthur and Harry S. Truman were successful in rallying support for the war effort in the beginning, there was an almost instant lagging of support following the realization that the Nationalist Party's rule was ineffective and that the commitment of the United States had no large return (Pepper 751). Popular backlash against the administration that had orchestrated the conflict was in fact even more potent, with dissidents such as Joe McCarthy blasting the original Marshall Mission for the eventual failure of the Nationalist Party, despite Chang Kai-Shek's inept military leadership (Buck 158)

When Marshall was sent to China with secret State Department orders, the Communists at that time were bottled up in two areas and were fighting a losing battle, but that because of those orders the situation was radically changed in favor of the Communists. Under those orders, as we know, Marshall embargoed all arms and ammunition to our allies in China. He forced the opening of the Nationalist-held Kalgan Mountain pass into Manchuria, to the end that the Chinese Communists gained access to the mountains of captured Japanese equipment. No need to tell the country about how Marshall tried to force Chiang Kai-shek to form a partnership government with the Communists (McCarthy 247).

In the American home-front there was a low, yet still existing dissatisfaction with the failure of the government to secure any real gains while wasting a disproportionately high amount of resources. But in particular, the fomentation of political dissent, though prevalent in most cases of political failure was yet another factor of the American involvement in the Chinese Civil War. Though not distinctly a metric by itself, there is an extent to which it can be argued that the similarities between the Chinese Civil War in host state reaction, intruder state progression, and general escalation of conflict as well as eventual resolution would only further

evidence that the Chinese Civil War was in fact one of the framing conflicts of the Cold War. That is to say, in almost every case of Cold War conflict, that which happened in China also happened in every other example.

In re-evaluating the pertinence of the Chinese Civil War, it is necessary to realize that as a conflict itself, the latter half of the war had almost been stripped of its identity as a specifically Chinese conflict. This is not to undermine its relevant importance to the history of China, but rather to say that the mediation of the conflict by the eminent superpower of the time painted the war in a context that is not readily interpreted. Thus, while traditional understanding of history might paint the Chinese Civil War still as a distinctly Chinese conflict, and while it does play its role in shaping modern China, at the same time, it played its role in shaping the modern world. Through analysis of the metrics through which Cold War conflict can be determined, the Chinese Civil War fits the standard foil almost perfectly. On top of that, the Chinese Civil War provides one of the first examples to frame the American mindset of the Cold War which continues to affect the modern era. In that regards, the Chinese Civil War was not simply one of the first conflicts of the Cold War, but also one of the most important shapers of the modern era in that it provided a context for the next century of history to occur.

Word Count: 4111

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This article on the usage of the atomic bomb during World War II on Hiroshima and Nagasaki provides some context on the Cold War. This isn't explicitly used in the Thesis itself but was helpful for some background research on the Cold War.

Buck, David D. "Chinese Civil War of 1945–1949." *Encyclopedia of Modern Asia*. Ed. Karen Christensen and David Levinson. Vol. 2. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 2002. 29-31. Gale Virtual Reference Library. Web. 29 Apr. 2014

This encyclopedia entry was mostly useful for providing context and information on the Chinese Civil War. It was a good primer on the events that happened and the exact timeline of the conflict. Was used somewhat in the background, but mostly helped to create a knowledge basis for my topic area.

Chen, Jian. *Mao's China and the Cold War*. Chapel Hill: U of North Carolina, 2001. Print.

Chen himself was pretty helpful in writing my thesis because it gave a decent context on the Chinese history and was just interesting to read, but most of what was in this book didn't focus on a timeframe that was helpful to me. The book itself is talking about post Civil War politics and Mao's influence. While some of it does focus on Mao's policies during the war and his objectives, it is not the most relevant to my thesis.

Cheng, Victor Shiu Chiang. "Modern War on an Ancient Battlefield: The Diffusion of American Military Technology and Ideas in the Chinese Civil War, 1946-1949." *JSTOR*. Sage Publications, n.d. Web. 07 Nov. 2014.

This source was mostly used for the military aspect of the Chinese Civil War that I had to cover and was useful for looking at the extent of American involvement. Was also mildly useful for finding numbers, though not a lot were in it

Cleveland, Harlan. "The Cold War." *National Archives and Records Administration*. National Archives and Records Administration, n.d. Web. 14 Jan. 2015.

This is used for a context on the Cold War and to provide a decent timeline in the background. Was helpful, though not extensively used. Is cited in the background.

Crapol, Edward. "Some Reflections on the Historiography of the Cold War." *JSTOR*. Society for History Education, n.d. Web. 21 Dec. 2014.

Used for background on the historiography of the Cold War. Helps frame the essay and helps provide a basis to argue on the interpretation of how normal Cold War conflicts should be seen.

Garver, John W. "Cold War and Revolution: Soviet-American Rivalry and the Origins of the Chinese Civil War by Odd Arne Westad Review By: John W. Garver." *JSTOR*. BRILL, n.d. Web. 02 Dec. 2014.

This is a review and was used to help me transition into better sources. It doesn't actually appear in the thesis itself, but the book that is reviewed was instrumental in writing my thesis

Hippler, Jochen. "Eurocentrism." *Özgür Üniversite Forumu* (n.d.): n. pag. *JochenChippler*. Jochen Chippler. Web.

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Levine, Steven I. "A New Look at American Mediation in the Chinese Civil War: The Marshall Mission and Manchuria*." *A New Look at American Mediation in the Chinese Civil War: The Marshall Mission and Manchuria*. Diplomatic History, n.d. Web. Jan.-Feb. 2015.

This article was really helpful in determining Marshall's mindset while on his mission. The whole of the article is devoted towards trying to ascertain Marshall's actual mission in China and whether or not it had to do with checking Soviet power. It was really useful and pretty relevant to my thesis.

May, Ernest R. "1947-48: When Marshall Kept the U.S. Out of War in China." *JSTOR*. The Journal of Military History, n.d. Web. 07 Nov. 2014.

This was very helpful in trying to determine political mindsets during the Chinese Civil War and to help me find out what politicians were thinking. While the journal entry itself speaks on the Marshall Mission, it also provides a lot of insight on the attitudes of Washington during the intervention period

May, Ernest R. *The Truman Administration and China, 1945-1949*. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1975. Print.

This book was mostly used for background to find out the attitudes of the Truman administration towards China. Was very helpful in developing the argument of my thesis because it helped me gauge the actual reasoning behind going to China.

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Source was helpful in finding exact numbers for the involvement of the United States in the Chinese Civil War

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This was helpful in interpretations of the Home Front both for the Chinese and for the Americans. While it extensively focuses on a Chinese lens, the parts where it does talk about the American reaction are pretty helpful

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One of the first Westad pieces that I read over the course of this research paper, but it was very helpful in providing general context on the course of the war in third world countries. It helped me build a knowledge base

Westad, Odd Arne. *Cold War and Revolution: Soviet-American Rivalry and the Origins of the Chinese Civil War, 1944-1946*. New York: Columbia UP, 1993. Print.

This book was probably the single most helpful book in writing my whole entire thesis and I had to specifically borrow it from Brandeis University through a colleague of my mother's to get it. Westad is a scholar on Cold War, specifically with East Asia, and his book was foundational to helping me argue my thesis because it provides much of the information necessary to be able to argue what I wanted to argue. The book basically talks about the Chinese Civil War in the context of the Cold War and its influences, which was an absolute gold mine.

Bibliographic Reflection

I think now that I'm finally done with the paper, I'm allowed to take a deep breath and celebrate because I just wrote around 4,000 words, annotated like 1,000 more, and basically drank so much tea that I'm caffeinated and shaking. But at the end of it all, I'm proud of my thesis because it is the result of my hard work and it is the result of hours being put in.

I think at the end of the day, the topic I picked wasn't exactly the most interesting thing and I sort of copped out by choosing a topic I was pretty familiar with to make the paper easy on me. As it turns out, because of how normative my argument was (trying to claim that the Chinese Civil War was actually the start of the Cold War), it was actually a really hard paper to write. There were just so many random metrics to try to determine, so much research to be done, and so little of an evidence base because of how nuanced the argument was at the same time. There aren't too many authors that write on the subject of the Chinese Civil War as a start to the Cold War. But I guess at the same time, that's why the subject is somewhat enticing - because less people know about it.

When I first began researching, I relied extensively on online resources and the Internet to try to fish out the information that would be necessary to write this thesis. At the end of the day, I ended up finding a lot of recycled or useless stuff that didn't really get to tell me much. But what I did find, which ended up being very helpful, were book reviews and journal reviews. In fact, these were the most instrumental to helping me write my thesis because they led me to the sources that were absolutely crucial

I think what my thesis has taught me is that my favorite author ever on the subject will forevermore be Odd Arne Westad. Westad's book was basically the central argument of my

thesis and I relied on it heavily. Levine and May were also crucial to my essay, and they were also from reviews.

I can't even remember the course of this whole process off the top of my head, but between the beginning and now, I don't know how much work I put in. I completed my detailed outline right before it was due, completely my rough draft a week in advance, and then got lazy. I did most of my final the day before, but because most of it had been sketched out, it wasn't too bad.

Difficulties, however, arose when on a final survey of my thesis, I realized that I wasn't targeting the central question well enough. Which ended up in me restructuring and rewriting most of my paper.

That I can tell you was not very fun.

All in all though, the best part of this process was honestly getting a cool book from the Brandeis library to help me research my topic. I don't think I've ever felt more special than when I got a university book. At the same time, I think doing the research for this topic and writing this paper were also pretty cool because it's all on my own. Actually scratch all of that, the best part was finishing.

The worst part of the process was trying to work doing my thesis around my other classes because there were a lot of the times when I would feel utterly overwhelmed. At the end of the day though, I just tried to persevere the best I could. And this is the product. So I hope you enjoyed. And if you didn't that's completely okay because at least I turned it in on time.