Using Baseball to Examine the Effects of Unions

A Case Study on How Unions Can Drastically Change a Business

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3/2/15
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In the mid-19th century, workers unions began cropping up around the United States, aiming to strip employers of the unlimited control that they wielded over the workers. While not always immediately effective, unions in general have undoubtedly helped the condition of workers nationwide; today, for example, the American Federation of Labor claims that union members earn 27% more than non-union workers.[1] But one industry that was late to join the trend was professional baseball. For a long time – in fact, for the large majority of baseball's history – the owners took complete advantage of the players. While Major League Baseball (MLB) has been very successful for nearly the entirety of its existence, the owners historically were the ones who saw the bulk of the revenue. The road to creating an immensely profitable environment for both owners and players has been a long one, and not without its challenges. Only when the players formed a powerful union and together leveraged themselves against the owners could they escape from the poor treatment they faced. Of course, MLB is not the only business to see the employer-employee relationship change with the introduction of a workers' union. However, although baseball players took far longer to unionize than workers in most other industries, they did so very effectively. Even in its earliest days, the union's excellent leadership succeeded in overcoming the owners' unilateral power and legal advantages, securing colossally higher pay and significantly better benefits. Since then, the union has continued to do much of the same, over time improving conditions for its players more and more. To this day, professional baseball serves as an excellent case study for how much the plight of workers can change with a union.

The first lasting professional baseball league was the National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, formed in 1876, and right away its principal goal was to increase profits by

[1] "The Union Difference." *AFLCIO.org*. American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, n.d. Web. 01 Mar. 2015.

reducing player salaries. To that end, the National League (NL), as it was called, set limits on the number of teams, gave teams territorial monopolies, and, most importantly, prohibited teams from taking other teams' players[2]. The league introduced a rule called the "reserve clause" to prevent players from leaving their teams. Under the clause, each team could reserve five players that would be barred from switching to an opposing club following each season. The number was gradually increased until, by 1890, all players were covered by the reserve clause. The effect of this was that players' rights to freely move teams were gone, and owners could easily depress salaries since players couldn't offer their skills in an open market. The NL's strict policies, however, alienated some players and owners. In 1881, a league called the American Association (AA) was formed consisting of teams that had been forced out of the NL for violating its rules. The most important distinction of the AA was that it had no reserve clause[3]. But in 1883, not long after the formation of the AA, the NL and AA joined together and formed one league so they wouldn't have to compete with one another for profits. The agreement to merge, known as the National Agreement, formed the entity of Organized Baseball, which encompassed the "major" leagues – the NL and AA – as well as "minor" leagues – smaller, less popular ones. Since the NL was the larger league, the reserve clause was still in effect. Meanwhile, a separate league called the Western League was formed in 1892 by Ban Johnson. This league enjoyed decent success, and in 1901 Johnson declared his league – which had been renamed the American League (AL) a little over a year earlier – to be a major league. This posed a threat to the National League (which by now was the dominant league of Organized Baseball), since Johnson began taking players from that league.[4] A new agreement was signed in 1903 and the American League became the second major league next to the NL. This is how Major League

[2] Duquette p. 4-5
[3] Duquette p. 3
[4] Duquette p. 8

Baseball as currently constructed was formed, and the NL and AL from then are the same NL and AL that exist today. But as was the case for the beginning of baseball's life, players and owners did not always have the same goals, and the rift between the two would only grow as baseball became more profitable.

In 1922, an historic change was made to the way that MLB was allowed to run. A case, *Federal Baseball v. National League*, reached the Supreme Court. The case had started a few years earlier when the Federal League, a new upstart professional baseball league, had filed an antitrust lawsuit against MLB, alleging that it was monopolizing the professional baseball industry. MLB realized that such a suit could hurt their control of the baseball market, so they bought out all but one Federal League team, the Baltimore Terrapins, who were not willing to sell themselves. The Baltimore club continued to pursue the case, which, after several appeals, reached the Supreme Court. The Court ruled that MLB was not subject to federal antitrust law – law regulating big business and promoting free trade and competition – because professional baseball did not constitute interstate commerce, which is the only trade that Congress can regulate and the only type of business that federal antitrust law deals with.[5] In the words of the court:

> The transport [of teams and players] is a mere incident, not the essential thing. That to which it is incident, the exhibition, although made for money would not be called trade or commerce in the commonly accepted use of those words. As it is put by the defendants, personal effort, not related to production, is not a subject of commerce.[6]

This case effectively exempted Major League Baseball from all federal antitrust law, a decision that has been criticized and scrutinized extensively since. But regardless of the wisdom of the ruling, MLB was guaranteed special protection in the courts from antitrust law. One effect of this

[5] Grow, "Defining the Business of Baseball" p. 566-7. This citation covers the whole paragraph up to this point.

[6] Federal Baseball Club v. National League.

was that no new leagues could successfully sue MLB for conspiring against them to monopolize the baseball market (sure enough, the Federal League was the last major threat to MLB's monopoly). This decreased the leverage that the players had because it ensured that MLB would be the only league that the players could play in for any kind of decent pay, as any larger leagues would be destroyed. And it made fighting against the reserve clause, which was still in place and still repressed salaries tremendously, much harder: otherwise, the reserve clause might have been determined to be illegal due to antitrust law, as it was a way to conspire to restrict trade, but with the antitrust exemption that did not matter. The reserve clause was safe from any conceivable threat, since the owners controlled everything within their league, and the law would be on their side should matters reach the courts. The 1922 *Federal Baseball* case provided owners with excellent protection from some of the competition and threats that they faced.

During the Great Depression, the owners were able to squeeze the players to increase their own revenue as much as possible. The players had absolutely no power; there was no semblance of any players' organization[7] and MLB was untouchable in the courts. One thing the owners did to maximize earnings was play around with the schedule. Owners scheduled exhibition games during off days and played doubleheaders on Sundays and holidays, the days with the highest attendance.[8] Games postponed due to rain were made up as doubleheaders later in the season instead of being moved to an open date because owners wanted to use the open dates for exhibition games where they could sell more tickets. Playing extra games, playing multiple games in one day, and more travel all put more strain on the players, especially pitchers.[9]. And a separate issue was that of night games. Owners wanted to play games at night in order to boost ticket sales, since fans usually worked during the day. But players were not too

[7] Duquette p. 34
[8] Surdam p. 169
[9] Surdam p. 175

happy with the idea of playing at night, as they "complain[ed] it upset their routine, eating and sleeping hours are juggled, and it is difficult, at times, to see the ball."[10] But of course, the owners were in charge and so night games commenced (albeit not without hesitation by some owners over the actual benefits of playing under lights). Overall, the owners benefited from these changes a great deal more than the players did, and the players had no leverage to protest any of them. Because the owners were so much more powerful, players couldn't fight against them in any way.

The 1940s and World War II presented new challenges for Major League Baseball. The war, which the U.S. joined following the 1941 season, caused an extreme loss of players from professional baseball, as many either were drafted into or volunteered for the military. The decreased talent level meant an inferior product, which lowered interest. Since the owners' profits were hurt by that lower interest level, they once again squeezed the players to fill their own pockets. The war provided a convenient excuse for the owners to lower salaries: as author Robert Burk put it, "owners… exploited patriotic arguments and fears for job security to browbeat their players into lower contracts."[11] Government-mandated wartime wage control also went into effect, freezing the maximum salary for each team at whatever its highest-paid player earned in 1942. The average MLB salary was $6,400 a year (about $86,000 in today's money,[12] which is higher than the average U.S. worker, but nowhere near what baseball players earn now or earned before then). The highest player salary in 1942 was $43,750 (the Yankees' Joe DiMaggio); in each of 1943, 1944, and 1945, it was $27,000 or less.[13] St. Louis Cardinals star

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[10] Surdam p. 220
[11] Burk p. 73
[12] "CPI Inflation Calculator." *CPI Inflation Calculator.* U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, n.d. Web. 25 Jan. 2015.
[13] Haupert, Michael. "MLB's Annual Salary Leaders, 1874-2012." *SABR.org.* Society for American Baseball Research, n.d. Web. 25 Jan. 2015.

Stan Musial, who won Rookie of the Year in 1942, received only a $1,000 raise from his $4,250 salary the next year despite being second only to teammate Enos Slaughter in batting average in the entire National League.[14] Owners were able to use wage control as justification for keeping player salaries depressed, despite the fact that the only stipulations of the wage control were that player salaries were capped at a fixed maximum – and that maximum was much higher than the average. Once again, the owners were taking advantage of the players.

Conditions for players were no better once the war ended. Returning players expected to be given their positions back, but at the same time, the fill-ins didn't expect to be let go after spending years in the Majors.[15] This led to significant contract disputes. In order to protect their authority, the owners passed a rule requiring that player salary negotiations could not be referred to arbitration (where an arbitrator would hear both sides and decide who to award the case to), and that owners would decide all player contracts.[16] The returning players, who expected wages at least comparable to the ones that they earned before they left for war, found themselves to be in conflict with the owners, who wanted to keep player pay as low as possible to maximize profits. Returning players were only guaranteed a paid 30-day preseason training and evaluation session with the team, after which the team could retain the player, send him to a minor league affiliate, or release him. Since choosing one of the first two options was usually expensive, veterans were often released, and the players could do nothing.[17] The post-war years of the 1940s were yet another instance of the players having no ability to stop the owners from doing what they wanted.

[14] Burk p. 74
[15] Burk p. 83
[16] Burk p. 83
[17] Burk p. 84

The 1950s through the mid-1960s saw Major League Baseball take a large financial hit. While the period could be characterized as mildly unsuccessful for the owners, it was disastrous for the players, who were once again taken advantage of in the name of higher profits for the owners. Revenue decreased during this decade for many reasons. One was the botching of TV deals by the owners. TV was relatively new at this point, and owners – who were not always the best negotiators – struck unfavorable TV deals that didn't make them as much money as they could have. There was also a demographic shift in the U.S. from urban, Northeastern cities to suburban Southern and Western towns, which decreased ticket sales because fewer people lived in cities close to ballparks. Some players also went to fight in the Korean War, which created a situation reminiscent of the early 1940s (though not as severe). The rise of the National Football League and other sports created more competition for baseball, and internal competition was low because ineffective revenue sharing reduced parity.[18] Owners, however, weren't hurt too much by this. They could always lower player salaries, which they did. Despite inflation, salaries didn't increase at all from the early 1950s to the early 1960s, and the minimum salary stood at $6,000 until the mid-1960s. Notably, the proportion of revenue that was given to players decreased 16% (percent, not percentage points) from 1950 to 1965.[19] Said soon-to-be player savior Marvin Miller in 2011, "People today don't understand how beaten down the players were back then. The players had low self-esteem, as any people in their position would have—like baggage owned by the clubs."[20] The owners, many of whom only owned their teams as a side project to their main businesses, were largely unwilling to invest in the teams beyond what was

[18] Burk p. 109-110. This citation is for the entire paragraph up to this point.
[19] Burk p. 112
[20] Dreier, Peter, and Kelly Candaele. "Marvin Miller's Lasting Legacy." *The American Prospect*. N.p., 1 Dec. 2012. Web. 28 Feb. 2015.

absolutely necessary. The baseball industry saw little growth during this period, and the players continued to be exploited.

Finally, in 1966, a lawyer named Marvin Miller took over the previously weak MLB Players Association – which had actually been formed 12 years before – and pushed harder for players' rights. The MLBPA was the first union backed by nearly every player, which let it have much more leverage against the owners. The first thing that Miller did was get funding by selling the rights to put players' faces on advertisements and bottles to Coca-Cola. With that funding, he turned to the owners to negotiate a higher pension plan and then a few years later a full collective bargaining agreement (CBA), or, as it's referred to in MLB terms, a basic agreement. The new basic agreement, which included a higher minimum salary among many other stipulations, was extremely favorable to the players,[21] thanks in large part to the owners' ineptitude and disunity as well as Miller's brilliant negotiating skills. But while this helped out the players, the biggest problem still remained: the reserve clause was still in effect, and players weren't allowed to leave their teams and offer their services on the open market. The antitrust law exemption had made challenging the reserve clause in court futile. And since none of the players were powerful enough to fight against the owners individually, a union was needed.

The process of removing the reserve clause began with the trading of outfielder Curt Flood from the St. Louis Cardinals to the Philadelphia Phillies after the 1969 season. Flood had been with the Cardinals for 11 years, but his performance was declining and his salary was high, so he was shipped off by St. Louis. Flood was understandably upset. He had been with the Cardinals for over a decade and had settled in St. Louis with his family. Flood wrote a letter to commissioner Bowie Kuhn expressing how upset he was with the trade, echoing the sentiment of a lot of players at the time:

[21] Burk p. 158

> After twelve years in the Major Leagues, I do not feel that I am a piece of property to be bought and sold irrespective of my wishes. I believe that any system which produces that result violates my basic rights as a citizen and is inconsistent with the laws of the United States and of the several States…. I, therefore, request that you make known to all the Major League Clubs my feelings in this matter…[22]

Flood, with the support of the union, sued Kuhn, charging that the reserve clause constituted both slavery and collusion intended to depress the value of players.[23] Removing the reserve clause would allow for freer trade (i.e., the movement of players from team to team); this made the clause a violation of antitrust law. The case went to the Supreme Court, which ruled 5-3 in favor of the owners because of MLB's pre-existing antitrust law exemption. But the case, though it did not succeed in court, had some important lasting effects. Most importantly, the case helped Miller and the union negotiate an arbitration system into the new basic agreement that was created in 1970. Under the pressure of the case and wanting to look more reasonable (the *Flood* case had lots of support from players and even fans), the owners were willing to implement a three-man arbitration panel, with arbitrators that weren't just owner puppets, that would decide cases between the players and the owners – including salary disputes.[24] To Miller, this provided an opportunity to challenge the reserve clause outside of the courts, where the owners had a huge advantage because of their antitrust law exemption. It also opened players' eyes to the possibility of free agency, being able to sign with any team on an open market. A few years later, in 1975, two players – Dave McNally and Andy Messersmith – used the arbitration system to challenge the reserve clause. The arbitrator ruled that the reserve clause should only affect players for one year, after which they could become free agents. This burst the proverbial dam that had held player salaries back for a century. With the reserve clause, players weren't free to choose the

[22] Flood, Curtis C. "Letter to Bowie Kuhn." Letter to Bowie Kuhn. 24 Dec. 1969. *Archives.gov*. National Archives, n.d. Web. 13 Feb. 2015.
[23] Grow, "Defining the Business of Baseball" p. 573
[24] Burk p. 164

highest bidder. Now, with free agency, a team had to outbid other teams in order to attract top-flight talent. No longer could owners mandate their players' salaries arbitrarily. A new era in baseball history had begun.

The union's biggest victory was the removal of the reserve clause and the beginning of free agency, but that was far from its only achievement. In the years between the implementation of the arbitration system and the McNally and Messersmith hearings, salaries grew anyways because of the leverage of the union and the arbitration system, which allowed players to argue for the salary that they thought they deserved. Writes Robert Burk of those years, "The union's power, exercised across a broad front for higher minimum salaries, better pensions, and free agency market leverage, was a rising tide intended to lift all player 'boats'."[25] The union's ability to fight for players who were mistreated by their teams – Alex Johnson, for example, an Angels player who was fined and suspended unjustly in 1971 despite his documented emotional illness[26] - ensured better treatment for those players. Continued negotiation on new basic agreements by the union kept increasing the minimum salary and pension for retired players; the 1976 basic agreement made the owners contribute an additional $2 million per year to the pension fund and made the minimum salary increase by a few thousand dollars every couple of years. The union gained the players less taxing schedules, better postseason benefits, a scholarship program for players who wanted to complete a college degree in the offseason, limits on what owners could require players to do, severance packages for players who were released (contrast this to what happened with players released during spring training after World War II), and many more minor concessions such as free parking at games, better allowances for road trips, paid travel expenses

[25] Burk p. 166
[26] Burk p. 169

to the All-Star Game and spring training, first class flights to away games, and more. [27] For the first time in baseball's history, player salaries rose to keep up with the owners' profits; the average salary more than doubled from 1975 to 1979 because of free agency and arbitration.[28] The success of the MLBPA in the 1970s and its continued success to this day have had resounding effects on the treatment of all MLB players.

There are a few reasons why the MLB Players Association was so effective, but by far the most important one was its excellent leadership. Miller's union was able to overcome all of the issues that previous attempts had faced: a lack of support, in the case of the American Baseball Guild, a union that was formed in 1946 but got no support from big-name players and collapsed after a failed strike;[29] no way to circumvent the antitrust exemption while trying to remove the reserve clause, in the case of *Toolson vs. Yankees*, a suit by a Yankees minor leaguer charging that the reserve clause was illegal;[30] or an unwillingness to challenge the owners head-on, in the case of the Brotherhood of Professional Base Ball Players, a group of players in the 19th century who decided not to fight against the owners but instead form their own league which was later bought out by Organized Baseball.[31] A good example of Miller's style is his first collective bargaining agreement with the owners. That first agreement was largely a result of his persistence in getting the owners to negotiate in the first place. The owners first wanted to implement a non-negotiated deal that would not be horrible for the players but would prevent any further bargaining from which the union might benefit; this is what they would have done any time beforehand. Miller, however, convinced the owners that this would be a violation of labor law and got them to retract the deal. Then the owners wanted to wait out the union in hopes

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[27] Burk p. 206-211. This citation applies to everything preceding it regarding the CBA of 1976.
[28] Burk p. 208
[29] Burk p. 88-91
[30] Grow, "Defining the Business of Baseball" p. 569
[31] Zimbalist p. 5

that it wouldn't survive long enough to negotiate an agreement. But the endorsement deal that Miller had struck with Coca-Cola, in addition to his ability to secure dues from players, showed the owners that the union was strengthening instead of weakening and forced them to broker a basic agreement before the union got too powerful.[32] This was a theme throughout all of the collective bargaining negotiations that were held with Miller as president of the union, and it helped Miller and the union win nearly every negotiation while Miller was president. Miller's successful negotiating, his willingness to listen to any player's requests, and his likeability and relatability made him popular with the players. The players gave him their full support, which in turn made the union stronger and helped it be even more successful at the negotiating table.[33] It was also Miller who encouraged McNally and Messersmith to challenge the reserve clause in arbitration, leading to free agency. Sure enough, when Miller retired from position of MLBPA president in 1982, the union struggled for a period afterwards, at least until a former Miller protégé named Donald Fehr took over and steered the union back in the right direction. The force that Miller had constructed was so powerful that despite some setbacks, it continued – and continues to this day – to represent and fight for the players.

A good way to summarize the effectiveness of the union is to look at the average major league salary by year (Burk p. 307, appendix A). Before the union was created, almost no salary growth occurred, and the little that did was only enough to correspond with inflation. After Miller took over and before free agency, there was a small increase due to higher minimum salaries. Then with the advent of free agency, the average started steadily rising before shooting up as more and more players became free agents. (The dip in 1994 is from money lost due to a player strike.) The average today, 15 years after the graph ends, is even higher. And that's not to

[32] Burk p. 153
[33] Burk p. 153-4

mention the other benefits that the players got – things like better pensions, better postseason bonuses, better transportations for far-away games, higher minimum salaries, and much more; nowadays, the union has some power over everything from rule changes to trades. Marvin Miller's leadership and support helped to create what is perhaps one of the most successful unions in America. Indeed, sports law professor Glenn Wong asserts that "the MLBPA is widely considered the most powerful union in sports and one of the most powerful unions in the United States."[34] It would not be a stretch to claim that had the union never been formed, MLB players would not see anything resembling the exorbitant salaries that they do today and they generally would not be as well-treated or as happy as they are. The MLB Players Association could be considered the perfect union; its incredible power, excellent leadership, and monumental accomplishments make it a model for all other worker unions to base themselves on.

More than being a model union, though, the MLBPA shows how important unions really are to employees. Inarguably, the treatment that players received from the owners through the early 1960s was contemptible and unfair, and, not unlike non-unionized workers of many other businesses, they had no say in their bosses' decisions when it came to their own treatment. MLB is a classic example of a business where workers were constantly marginalized and taken advantage of before unionizing and thereby prospering. One needn't look further than the baseball industry itself to see other examples of how poorly workers who are not part of a union can be treated, since Minor League Baseball today faces many of the same problems that Major League Baseball did over 50 years ago – minor league players do not have a say in their salary, are very poorly compensated, receive little to no benefits, and can't choose to switch teams even if they think that doing so would get them a better chance at reaching the major leagues. But the MLBPA provides a perfect example of the improved conditions that come with a union, too. As

[34] Wong p. 253

shown earlier, the treatment of major league ballplayers improved dramatically with the arrival of Miller and the stronger union, and with a union so too can the treatment of any worker.

Word count: 4302

Appendix A



Average MLB Salary by year in dollars – Burk p. 307

Bibliography

"Attendance Marks Bettered," The Sporting News, June 19, 1930, 4.

Primary source magazine. Used for a quote about the condition of baseball during the Depression. The Sporting News is a magazine (and now a website) that has been around for a very long time, back then focusing heavily on baseball.

Burk, Robert Fredrick. *Much More than a Game: Players, Owners, & American Baseball since 1921*. Chapel Hill: U of North Carolina, 2001. *Questia*. Web. 1 Dec. 2014.

Book used extensively for the sections on the 1940s and onwards. Indispensable resource for those paragraphs. Very interesting; went into lots of details about the stories behind the events. The main focus of the book was the relations between players and owners, which made it extremely helpful and pertinent. Presumably a sequel or follow-up to his similarly-titled *Never Just a Game: Players, Owners, and American Baseball to 1920*. This guy needs to switch things up a little when he's titling his books. But he's a good writer who clearly did some very thorough research to write this, so I won't complain too much.

"CPI Inflation Calculator." *CPI Inflation Calculator*. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, n.d. Web. 25 Jan. 2015.

Inflation calculator used when referencing salaries in terms of today's dollars. Only used once, in the paragraph about WWII-era baseball. It's on the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics's website, so it's probably pretty accurate.

Dreier, Peter, and Kelly Candaele. "Marvin Miller's Lasting Legacy." *The American Prospect*. N.p., 1 Dec. 2012. Web. 28 Feb. 2015.

Article about Marvin Miller published shortly after his death; just used for a quote from him. *The American Prospect* is a very liberal magazine, so it would make sense that they would praise Marvin Miller, as the union is generally a pretty liberal construct. But the article wasn't used for anything but a quote, so no worries of bias.

Duquette, Jerold J. *Regulating the National Pastime: Baseball and Antitrust*. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999. *Questia*. Web. 3 Nov. 2014.

Book used for background information on the early history of baseball, as well as information on the court cases in the early 20th century, all for the first few paragraphs. Not used so much for information about the antitrust exemption because that was not as big of a part of my paper. It was a pretty dense book that was a little bit all over the place and hard to get through (I didn't read all of it; I realized that it wasn't really all necessary for me to read it for my paper).

Federal Baseball Club v. National League. Supreme Court. 29 May 1922. *Casetext.com*. J2H2, n.d. Web. 30 Dec. 2014.

Written majority and minority opinion from the *Federal Baseball v. National League* case in 1922. Used as a reference for describing the facts of the case. This was the case that established MLB's antitrust exemption. Primary source. Casetext is a website that has lots of legal documents available (many annotated by lawyers).

Flood, Curtis C. "Letter to Bowie Kuhn." Letter to Bowie Kuhn. 24 Dec. 1969. *Archives.gov*. National Archives, n.d. Web. 13 Feb. 2015.

The letter from Curt Flood to Bowie Kuhn describing his opinion about the trade that sent him from St. Louis to Philadelphia; used as a block quote. Primary source. From the National Archives website (this was a pretty important letter).

Freedman, Warren. *Professional Sports and Antitrust*. New York: Quorum, 1987. *Questia*. Web. 2 Dec. 2014.

Not cited, but used as background for information on antitrust law and its application in sports. Was originally part of my paper, but I changed my thesis around. Not an especially important source.

Grow, Nathaniel. "Defining the Business of Baseball." *University of California, Davis Law Review* 44.557 (2010): 557-623. Print.

Used for information on the *Flood* case from 1972 and a little bit on the *Toolson* case from 1953. Article in a law review, written by somebody I know (kind of), aiming to determine the scope of MLB's antitrust exemption. Not used for information about the antitrust exemption and instead used for background information on the *Flood*/*Toolson* cases.

Grow, Nathaniel. "In Defense of Baseball's Antitrust Exemption." *American Business Law Journal* 49.2 (2012): 211-73. Print.

Same author that I (kind of) know. Used to develop background knowledge on baseball's antitrust exemption. Not cited. The article defends MLB's antitrust exemption, which has faced a lot of scrutiny.

Haupert, Michael. "MLB's Annual Salary Leaders, 1874-2012." *SABR.org*. Society for American Baseball Research, n.d. Web. 25 Jan. 2015.

Used when referencing the highest salaries by year in the paragraph on the 1940s. From SABR (The Society for American Baseball Research), a highly respected organization from which the term sabermetrics comes from, so it's very reliable.

Jennings, Kenneth M. *Balls and Strikes: The Money Game in Professional Baseball*. New York: Praeger, 1990. *Questia*. Web. 3 Nov. 2014.

Not cited, but used for background information on the mid-1960s era and Marvin Miller. Most of the information in here was already covered in the Burk book.

Surdam, David G. *Wins, Losses, and Empty Seats: How Baseball Outlasted the Great Depression*. Lincoln: U of Nebraska, 2011. *Questia*. Web. 4 Nov. 2014.

Book used extensively for the paragraphs covering the Great Depression. Not a very good book (not well-written), but had lots of good information that I could use. The Great Depression was a larger focus of my paper initially, and therefore this a more important source, but I changed my focus.

"The Union Difference." *AFLCIO.org*. American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, n.d. Web. 01 Mar. 2015.

The website of the AFL and CIO, the biggest union center in the country. The webpage I used was focused on the difference unions could make and included some statistics about that. Cited only in my opening paragraph.

Wong, Glenn M. *The Comprehensive Guide to Careers in Sports*. Sudbury, MA: Jones and Bartlett, 2009. *Google Books*. Google. Web. 28 Feb. 2015.

Book that contains a small section on the MLBPA and asserts that it is one of the most powerful unions in the U.S. That assertion is quoted so as to have a more authoritative figure back up my claim that the union is that powerful. Otherwise not cited or used.

Zimbalist, Andrew S. *Baseball and Billions: A Probing Look inside the Big Business of Our National Pastime*. New York, NY: Basic, 1992. *Questia*. Web. 12 Feb. 2015.

Book about the business of baseball; had lots of good information about baseball's early history and explained some things in greater detail which I had had trouble understanding. Very useful, but not cited as much as it was used for explanations. I found this source way too late.